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ORIGINALISM: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
Keith E. Whittington*
The theory of originalism is now well into its second wave. Originalism
first came to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s as conservative critics
reacted to the decisions of the Warren Court, and the Reagan
Administration embraced originalism as a check on judicial activism. A
second wave of originalism has emerged since the late 1990s, responding to
earlier criticisms and reconsidering earlier assumptions and conclusions.
This Article assesses where originalist theory currently stands. It outlines
the points of agreement and disagreement within the recent originalist
literature and highlights the primary areas of continuing separation
between originalists and their critics.
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INTRODUCTION
Originalism as an approach to constitutional interpretation and a guide to
the exercise of judicial review enjoyed its greatest prominence in the 1980s.
The Reagan Administration invited public debate over judicial philosophy,
and the Administration controversially committed itself to the search for
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University. I thank Larry
Solum, Randy Barnett, Larry Alexander, Ken Kersch, and Mary Bilder for their helpful
comments.

375

376

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

original meaning as the correct approach to construing the Constitution.1
Attorney General Edwin Meese, Judge Robert Bork, and then-Judge
Antonin Scalia became the high-profile advocates for originalism.2 The
Federalist Society was founded, and promoted the “great debate” over
originalism between such figures as Meese and Bork on the one hand, and
Justices William Brennan and John Paul Stevens on the other.3 Given this
history, it is no surprise that concerns about originalism were a prominent
theme in the debate over the nomination of Robert Bork to the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1987.4
The Reagan era was also a time for active academic debate over the
intellectual merits of originalism. By the time Robert Bork5 and Antonin
Scalia6 published their book-length defenses of originalism, their views
were both familiar and well mooted in the literature. The political salience
of originalism undoubtedly boosted academic interest in the theory, but the
period was also a fertile time for such theoretical debates.7 Scholarly
debates revolved around competing “grand constitutional theories”
concerned with justifying and guiding the exercise of judicial review.8
Raoul Berger’s Government by Judiciary,9 backed by his aggressive
defense of its theoretical premises in law review articles,10 fit right in with
John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust11 and Ronald Dworkin’s A Matter
of Principle.12
Originalist theory has continued to develop and grow in the intervening
years, even if the Bork nomination continues to define the image of
originalism for many. Paul Brest launched the 1980s with an influential
article bemoaning the “misconceived quest for the original understanding”

1. See generally JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
133–60 (2007).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1984); Edwin Meese III, U.S. Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association
(July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 1, 1
(Paul G. Cassel ed., 1986); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849 (1988).
3. See generally THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2.
4. O’NEILL, supra note 1, at 170–75.
5. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
6. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997).
7. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 132–64 (1996)
(describing how the originalism debate fit into other trends in normative constitutional
theory).
8. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE 1 (1988); see also Keith E. Whittington,
Herbert Wechsler’s Complaint and the Revival of Grand Constitutional Theory, 34 U. RICH.
L. REV. 509, 509–10 (2000).
9. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
10. See O’NEILL, supra note 1, at 111–32.
11. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
12. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
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of the Constitution.13 Daniel Farber closed the decade with a “guide for the
perplexed” to the originalism debate.14 With the rise of a “new
originalism,”15 it is perhaps time for a new brief “tourist guide”16 that
outlines some of the key features of originalism as it stands today. As
originalist arguments have proliferated and deepened, some have
questioned whether there is anything distinctive left to the label.17
Certainly the old familiar standards may no longer be the best touchstones
for discussing modern originalism.
This Article provides a critical guide to the current state of originalist
theory.18 Part I focuses on some key points of general agreement among
originalist theorists,19 while Part II identifies some key points of contention
among originalists about originalist theory. Part III focuses on some central
points of continuing separation between originalists and their critics.
I. POINTS OF AGREEMENT
Before examining some of the more interesting points of agreement
among current originalists, it would be useful to clarify what I mean by
originalism. At its most basic, originalism argues that the discoverable
public meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption should
be regarded as authoritative for purposes of later constitutional
interpretation.20 The text of the Constitution itself, including its structural
design, is a primary source of that public meaning, but extrinsic sources of
specifically historical information might also elucidate the principles
embodied in the text of the Constitution.21 Each textual provision must
13. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204 (1980).
14. Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1085 (1989).
15. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620
(1999); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004).
Or, in Ken Kersch’s helpful terms, the development of a “proactive originalism,” to be
contrasted to the “reactive originalism” of the 1970s and 1980s. See Ken I. Kersch,
Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism: The Discursive Development of Constitutional
Conservatism in National Review, 1955–1980, 25 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 86, 103 (2011).
16. Farber, supra note 14, at 1085.
17. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009).
18. Unlike Farber, I am not concerned in this Article with reviewing the entire
originalism debate. This Article concentrates on just one side of the debate and is intended
to provide a brief, accessible introduction to modern originalism. At the same time, this
Article does not attempt to inventory all the recent work on originalism. I identify what I
take to be some major themes in the current literature on originalism, but I do not pursue
other features that can no doubt be found in the literature, and I do not marshal systematic
evidence to support my particular conclusions about the current contours of the literature.
19. The level of agreement is never, of course, complete, even on these central points.
Unsurprisingly, some still prefer that old-time religion and remain a bit puzzled by the
apparent shift. See Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of
Law, San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-028, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1150447.
20. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 35 (1999);
Whittington, supra note 15, at 599.
21. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 35.
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necessarily bear the meaning attributed to it at the time of its own adoption.
Later constitutional amendments stand separately from the original
Constitution, reflecting different purposes, understandings, and debates.22
The two crucial components of originalism are the claims that
constitutional meaning was fixed at the time of the textual adoption and that
the discoverable historical meaning of the constitutional text has legal
significance and is authoritative in most circumstances. Lawrence Solum
has called the first claim the “fixation thesis.” In his terms, the “semantic
meaning” of the text was “fixed” at the time it was written and formally
adopted.23 The semantic content of a word or phrase may drift over time,
but the fixation thesis contends that the proper meaning of a word within a
particular document is the one that was meant at the time of the document’s
creation, rather than alternative meanings that might have emerged later or
been in use earlier.24 Solum has called the second claim the “contribution
thesis”—the idea that “the linguistic meaning of the Constitution constrains
the content of constitutional doctrine.”25 Historical meaning might
“contribute” to or constrain the development of legal doctrine for reasons
internal to our particular legal culture and its commitments to, and
understandings of, the rule of law, or for reasons external to our legal
system that appeal to a normatively compelling political theory.26 As we
shall see, there is space for disagreement over such questions of how best to
justify the contribution thesis or how strongly the contribution thesis ought
to be framed (i.e., how much should original meaning constrain legal
doctrine?), but these two components—that the meaning of the text is
historically fixed and that the historical meaning constrains legal
meaning—are at the heart of originalist theory.
A. Original Meaning
The terms of the debate have shifted somewhat over time, from talking
about “original intent” to talking about “original meaning.” The turn to
22. Thus, it is possible, for example, for the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to have a different original meaning than the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Within this paper, I use “Founding” generally as the point of historical interest
for originalism, but strictly speaking the examination of the meaning of any given piece of
constitutional text would be centrally interested in the period of that text’s adoption.
23. Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 923, 944 (2009). I express some caution about the turn to “semantics” in Keith E.
Whittington, Dworkin’s ‘Originalism’:
The Role of Intentions in Constitutional
Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 207–16 (2000). Ultimately Solum’s approach to “semantic
originalism” comes closer to mirroring the practice of searching for illocutionary intent than
Dworkin’s abstracted and normatively infused “semantic intentions.”
24. Solum, supra note 23, at 944–46.
25. Id. at 954.
26. Id.; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 49, 61, 110–13. Just how constraining
original meaning might be on the content of constitutional law is also left ambiguous by
Solum. As the name of the thesis implies, Solum primarily argues that original meaning
“contributes” to “the legal content of constitutional law.” Solum, supra note 23, at 954. He
at least leaves open the possibility that the contribution is not complete and that the original
meaning of the constitutional text and the legal content of constitutional law will not be
identical.
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original meaning reflects some theoretical and practical adjustments in
emphasis within the literature on originalism.
1. Original Meaning and Original Intent
The first point of substantial agreement among modern originalists is an
emphasis on original meaning of the constitutional text. Justice Scalia has
referred to this by the somewhat misleading label of “textualism.”27 By
textualism, Scalia has in mind the “objectified intent” of the legislature—
what “a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed
alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”28 Scalia clarifies that what the
reasonable person should be gathering is the “original meaning of the
text.”29
There are alternative ideas about the definition of original meaning, but
ultimately these different ways of framing the issue have little consequence.
In the early stages of the debate, scholars were more likely to refer to the
“original intent” than to the “original meaning.” Thus, in his classic article
advancing the idea of originalism, Robert Bork tended to refer to “framers’
intent.”30 At times, the reference to what “the framers actually . . .
intended” could readily be understood as simply a loose way of talking
about the combination of “text and history”31 or the “text, structure, and
history of the Constitution”32—in other words, the kind of “objectified
intent” that Scalia has emphasized.33 But at other times, original intent was
clearly used to refer to subjective states of mind of individual Framers.34
The slippage is understandable since the inquiry was almost always said to
be one of discovering what they meant when creating this constitutional

27. SCALIA, supra note 6, at 23. Even Brest suggests this linkage in his early critique of
originalism, observing that his focus was on theories that emphasized “the interpretation of
text and original history as distinguished, for example, from the interpretation of precedents
and social values.” Brest, supra note 13, at 204 n.1.
28. SCALIA, supra note 6, at 17.
29. Id. at 38.
30. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 13 (1971).
31. Id. at 16–17; see also Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell,
Jr.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 55, 19 (1971) (statement of
William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States, Office of Legal Counsel)
(pledging to focus on “the use of the language used by the framers, the historical materials
available,” and “the intent of the framers of the Constitution”).
32. Robert H. Bork, Original Intent: The Only Legitimate Basis for Constitutional
Decision Making, JUDGES J., Summer 1987, at 13, 15.
33. SCALIA, supra note 6.
34. See, e.g., Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re
Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
967 (2004); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988). But the
distinctive significance of subjective intent for originalism was more often emphasized by
critics than proponents of originalism, who in turn highlighted the complications associated
with a pursuit of subjective intentions. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE
CONSTITUTION 10–16 (1986); Brest, supra note 13; H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern
Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987).
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text. What was “the meaning attached by the framers to the words they
employed in the Constitution”?35
Alternative ways of framing the theory appealed to “original public
understanding” or “original public meaning.” Although such language
might also be used interchangeably, as Paul Brest did in his defining
critique of this approach to constitutional interpretation,36 there is at least
the potential for subtly distinguishing among them. Henry Monaghan, for
example, emphasized that the “relevant inquiry must focus on the public
understanding of the language when the Constitution was developed.”37
Quoting Alexander Hamilton, Monaghan pointed out that the “intention . . .
to be sought” is “in the instrument itself.”38 How was the text received and
understood by the people assembled in the state ratifying conventions?
How would it have been understood by lawyers and jurists familiar with the
“usual & established rules of construction”?39 Similarly, Gary Lawson
characterized originalism, or “originalist textualism,” as “a method which
searches for the ordinary public meanings that the Constitution’s words . . .
had at the time of those words’ origins.”40 The interpreter’s goal was to
find evidence that would help illuminate the “text’s original public
meaning.”41 The implicit contrast was both with any current public
meaning that might conflict with the historical meaning and with any
original private meaning that might have been held by individual drafters.
Originalist theory has now largely coalesced around original public
meaning as the proper object of interpretive inquiry. Although the
terminology deployed can still vary, “originalism” or “original meaning”
has now pretty clearly taken dominance over “original intent” as the
preferred shorthand for this collection of theories.42 In part, original
meaning better captures the primary orientation of even the early literature
in the 1970s and 1980s, for which understanding “the Constitution
according to the intention of those who conceived it” almost never meant

35. BERGER, supra note 9, at 363. Similarly, in my initial writings on this subject, I used
original intent and original meaning interchangeably, ultimately arguing that what mattered
was the intent “embodied in the text.” WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 181.
36. Brest, supra note 13, at 204 (stating that originalism is the approach that “accords
binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters” and
advocates “[a]dherence to the text and original understanding”).
37. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 725 (1988).
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act To
Establish a Bank, in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 111 (H. Syrett ed., 1965)); see
also Scalia, supra note 2, at 854 (describing the Constitution as having “a fixed meaning
ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to those learned in the law”).
40. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1992).
41. Id.
42. Perhaps indicative of the transition is the shift in the historian (and critic of
originalism) Jack Rakove’s books on the subject. Compare INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990), with JACK
N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1997).
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“look[ing] inside for the truest account of their brain states at the moment
that the texts were created.”43
More substantively, the focus on original public meaning more clearly
emphasizes two aspects of the originalist approach. First, original meaning
better captures the public authority of the text. The Constitution as drafted
and ratified is the supreme law of the land by virtue of its ratification and
continued acceptance by the people, not by virtue of its drafting history or
the superiority of the virtue or intellect of James Madison and his brethren.
The goal of constitutional interpretation is not to capture what James
Madison meant but to capture what the constitutional text means. Though
determining what is entailed by a project of capturing the meaning of the
constitutional text is properly the subject of controversy and debate, the
idea of original public meaning at least better identifies the content and
orientation of one contender within that debate.
Second, original meaning better captures the search for the public
meaning of an objective legal rule. The language of original intent too
often encouraged the pursuit down false trails in an effort to locate the
preferences of political actors, or buried ideas, or value systems. At the end
of the day, constitutional interpretation by judges is concerned with
understanding and articulating authoritative legal rules, and a vital task of
originalism is to help guide constitutional interpreters to a better
understanding of the applicable constitutional rules.
A clearer focus on original public meaning also minimizes some of the
problems that were thought to be associated with original intent.44 First, it
avoids some of the problems associated with the search for subjective
intent. Paul Brest took the lead in criticizing a method that would seek to
“try to figure out how [the legislator] would have decided any particular
case.”45 The degree of knowledge on the part of the interpreter, and the
degree of foresight on the part of the legislator, to persuasively build such a
counterfactual for issues that might arise today seemed to require heroic
assumptions. By contrast, even Brest conceded that relevant evidence for
identifying the historical public meaning of the text was readily available,
even if it was not always determinant or determinative.46

43. Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100
HARV. L. REV. 751, 756, 759 (1987).
44. Such concerns are unlikely to go away entirely, even if the theory is more clearly
understood to be concerned with original meaning. Interpreters must still attempt to
determine what the public or commonly understood meaning of a given constitutional
provision might be and what legal rule might be embodied in a given piece of text, and those
tasks will still involve sifting through potentially contradictory or incomplete evidence and
making the best possible judgment as to what the evidence suggests. And, of course, critics
of originalism are still likely to have a variety of other concerns about the approach besides
those specifically associated with some forms of intentionalism.
45. Brest, supra note 13, at 212. It is possible that the category of “strict intentionalist”
as Brest defined it was always a null set, since few commentators of the period seem to have
endorsed this approach and Brest did not cite any examples.
46. Id. at 231 (“Moderate originalism is a perfectly sensible strategy of constitutional
decisionmaking.”).
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Second, the focus on public meaning also avoids some of the problems
associated with uncovering collective intent. In practice, legal interpreters
do not deal with a legislator, but rather with a legislature composed of
multiple legislators. If assessing original intent is the target for the
interpreter, then we may find ourselves enmeshed in efforts to count
“intention-votes” and determine how the myriad subjective intentions of
multiple legislators can be aggregated up into a single collective legislative
intent. Although lawyers and judges are familiar with discussions of
legislative intent (and the challenges associated with those discussions),
constitutional original intent was often thought to be more slippery,
subjective, and idiosyncratic. Recasting originalism in terms of original
meaning refocuses on the type of “objective” or “embodied” intent that is
closer to conventional understandings of legislative intent.
Even so, original “intent” still has some relevance in theories of
originalism. The historical sources of interest to originalists in the 1970s
and 1980s continue to have some bearing as useful evidence of public
meaning. Identifying how the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention
talked about and understood a given piece of text is a productive starting
point for uncovering the public meaning of that legal language in the
period. What James Madison might have recorded delegates as saying may
not have pride of place in determining the public meaning of a textual
provision, but when added to other sources of information it might well be
informative of how those familiar and careful with language understood the
content of the rule that was being debated and adopted. Even more
specifically, the records of Founding debates may be informative of the
significance of the particular choice of language incorporated into the text.
Such evidence must always be handled carefully. Alternative language, for
example, might have been rejected either because it was excluded from the
rule being adopted or because it was already included within that rule. But
understanding how a debate progressed when the formulation of the text
and the adoption of a rule were still uncertain may be helpful in unpacking
the nuance of meaning contained in a particular piece of text as it was used
in this context.
2. Expected Applications
But the greater theoretical attention to original meaning does have some
implications for the practice of originalist constitutional interpretation. An
orientation to public meaning rather than intentions calls attention to the
limited relevance of original expectations about legal applications. Like
many commentators in the initial round of debate over originalism, Brest
highlighted the potential significance of original expectations. He imagined
that the originalist interpreter would first ask, what would James Madison
do? The question not only invited an examination of the particular thoughts
and desires of a particular individual involved in the Founding debates, but
it also suggested that the goal of originalist constitutional interpretation was
to recapture the mindset of a Framer and implement their preferences for
how specific disputes ought to be resolved. The task seems simultaneously
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impossible and unappealing. Even if a judge could successfully channel
James Madison while answering the question of whether the Affordable
Care Act is consistent with the Commerce Clause, the results would not be
decisive for a proper originalist inquiry.
Specific expectations about the consequences of a legal rule are distinct
from the meaning of the rule itself. Bork took notice of this point as well,
though still speaking in terms of intentions.
In short, all an intentionalist requires is that the text, structure, and history
of the Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but with a major
premise. That premise states a core value that the Framers intended to
protect. The intentionalist judge must then supply the minor premise in
order to protect the constitutional freedom in circumstances the Framers
could not foresee.47

Although Bork situates this point in the context of “circumstances the
Framers could not foresee,” the argument is in fact generalizable to include
circumstances that the Founders could see.48 The point does not turn on the
“open textured” or “general” quality of the textual provision in question.49
The key issue is that the words used had a generally understood meaning
which expressed an identifiable rule. The rule might be rephrased in a way
that makes it easier to apply or that breaks out various key considerations
and subcomponents, but the textual provision embodies a legal commitment
of its own that the interpreter attempts first to ascertain. As such, the text,
structure, and history provide Bork’s “major premise.” The text does not,
however, tell the interpreter how to resolve a given dispute. Once the rule
itself is clarified, the resolution of a given dispute might be obvious. But
the effort to think through how a rule would apply to a given circumstance
is a distinct jurisprudential effort from that of identifying the appropriate
rule in the first place. A student must first understand what the accepted
constitutional rule for determining the scope of congressional power was
under the Commerce Clause at the turn of the twentieth century, but it is a
distinct task to then determine whether Congress could regulate stockyards
given that rule.
47. Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826 (1986).
48. It possible that Bork thought this point was restricted to those circumstances that the
Founders did not see. In his first forays into originalist theory, Bork implied that the
interpreter would be bound if the Founders had a clear and uniform view regarding a
particular application regardless of a generally phrased text. Bork is not clear why he might
have believed this would follow. Bork, supra note 30, at 13 (“If the legislative history
revealed a consensus about segregation in schooling . . . I do not see how the Court could
escape the choices revealed . . . even though the words are general and conditions have
changed.”).
49. Ronald Dworkin forcefully argued against a kind of expectations originalism, in
which constitutional provisions are read “to have the consequences that those who made
them expected them to have.” Ronald M. Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 119 (1997). Although I think this basic caution has been
widely accepted by originalists, I have more difficulty with the particular version of semantic
originalism that Dworkin recommended as the alternative to the flawed expectations
originalism. See Whittington, supra note 23, at 197.

384

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Why might the original expectations about the application of a rule and
the original content of the rule diverge? First, it must be recognized that
expectations about consequences are not dispositive to ascertaining the
content of the constitutional rule itself. The drafters of a constitutional
provision may have a variety of conflicting goals and expectations about a
constitutional provision, and yet reach an agreement on the meaning of the
provision under consideration. Borrowing from the political theorist
Quentin Skinner, we can usefully distinguish between an intent to do
something and an intent in doing something.50 A motive is prior to the text,
and is only contingently connected to the text (the motive could be
different, and yet the text and its meaning could be the same, or the motive
could be present, and a different text with different meaning could be
adopted). Similarly, expectations about applications are merely predictions
about the future consequences of adopting a given legal rule, and the author
of the rule has no special privilege in predicting the future.51
The drafters could, in fact, be wrong about the consequences of their own
constitutional rule. If they wrote a natural born citizen qualification for the
presidential office with a desire and expectation that this rule would
preclude a given individual from assuming the office, there could be a
perfect understanding of the meaning of the qualification and yet the
consequence may not follow (e.g., they were wrong about the birth status of
the individual in question, and thus the rule posed no obstacle to a
presidential run). Similarly, they could be wrong about the principled
implications that follow from the primary rule (e.g., how the natural born
citizen qualification would apply to children of ambassadors born on
foreign soil). The more complicated or less precise the constitutional text
being adopted, the more opportunities there will be for such mistakes or
uncertainties to arise. The array of possible implications and applications
of the age requirement for presidential eligibility may be easily foreseen
and well understood as the provision is being adopted. It might not be
possible to say the same about the standard for impeachable offenses.
Regardless, the proper mode of proceeding for a later adjudicator of a
constitutional dispute involving those provisions is not to ask how the
drafters would have resolved the present controversy. The proper inquiry is
what constitutional rule was adopted. Having determined the answer to that
question, the adjudicator must then determine how the rule applies to the
current dispute.
It is also worth recognizing that early government officials might not
have fully and faithfully implemented the adopted constitutional rule
themselves. It is commonplace for judges to take the early interpretation of
a constitutional provision as informative about the meaning of the
provision, and such early practice is no doubt informative in illuminating an
opaque rule. But such behavior should still be viewed with some
appropriate skepticism. Constitutional drafters self-consciously limited
50. Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions, and the Interpretation of Texts, in MEANING
73 (James Tully ed., 1988).
51. See also WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 177–78.

AND CONTEXT
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themselves, as well as others, by erecting constitutional fences. The
purpose of constitutional rules is not simply to bind future generations.
Political actors also tie their own hands by adopting a constitutional
limitation. The desire to bind contemporary government officials is part of
the reason that we prefer constitutional conventions that are distinct from
legislative assemblies, and ratification procedures that can affirm or reject
constitutional proposals independent of legislative will.52 Incumbent
politicians may have had a seat at the table when a constitutional provision
was drafted, but they cannot continue to claim ownership of the
constitutional text. Otherwise, they could readily assume the authority to
alter their handiwork at will. Higher lawmaking and normal lawmaking
should be kept distinct.
Moreover, early government officials had their own reasons to deviate
from constitutional rules. Understanding the constitutional rule is distinct
from adhering to the constitutional rule. Famously, the Federalists who had
advocated on behalf of the adoption of the Constitution in 1787 were
splintered by 1797. Although some of those disagreements might be
accounted for by subconstitutional conflicts or matters that had been left
unresolved in Philadelphia, the disputes also featured disagreements about
potentially knowable constitutional meaning. As Madison might have
anticipated, the faithful interpretation and application of constitutional rules
became more difficult once they were wrapped up in partisan fighting,
factional interests, and personality clashes. But even if early national
politicians had acted as one with little disagreement, the same
considerations could have affected their own ability to adhere to their prior
constitutional commitments. The exigencies of the moment could place
pressure on the first generation as easily as subsequent generations, and
evidence of how they would have or did interpret or apply constitutional
commitments should be held separate from evidence of how the rule was
understood when it was adopted.
Despite these cautions, expected applications might be helpful to later
interpreters in clarifying the substantive content of the embodied
constitutional rule. The Founders could be mistaken or disingenuous about
the implications of adopting a proposed rule, but the rule itself must be
publicly understandable.53 If examples of likely applications of the rule are
regularly offered and there is widespread agreement on such applications,
then they may be reflective of the content of the rule in question. If, for
example, a given application would help distinguish between two plausible
interpretations of a textual provision, then the existence of a consensus
52. The use of constitutions to target contemporary government officials is effectively
examined in the state context in EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG
PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 49–55 (2013).
53. Dworkin, by contrast, would hold open the possibility that the Founders were
mistaken about the rule itself, and not merely its applications. In his famous illustration, the
father might be wrong not only about what the implications of the commandment to “play
fair” but also about what the principle of fairness actually is. For Dworkin, it is the true
principle, not the legislator’s mistaken view of it, that is authoritative. RONALD M.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134–36 (1977).
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about the application might allow us to better understand which of the
plausible alternatives was in fact being proposed and adopted. The point is
not that the Founders correctly anticipated a given application, but that
knowing the application and its relationship to possible principles would
allow us to infer the otherwise obscure rule. The insight to be gleaned is
not the authoritative status of the expected application, but the apparent rule
at play given that such an application is expected to follow from it. If we
know that the Founders simultaneously adopted a rule against cruel and
unusual punishments and embraced the death penalty, this should not help
us assemble a list of accepted punishments or create a special carve-out for
the death penalty from the general principle. Rather, it should help guide us
in understanding what principle they thought they were adopting with the
cruel and unusual punishment clause.54
3. Rules and Standards
One implication that was often thought to follow from a focus on original
intentions was the narrow reading of constitutional provisions. Scalia has
notably argued against the identification of originalism and “strict
construction,” though the two were often linked by conservative politicians
and jurists in the 1970s and 1980s. As Scalia observed, the “text should not
be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be
construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”55 Thinking in
terms of specific intentions and expected applications can give
constitutional provisions the feel of a laundry list of allowed or proscribed
government actions. The interpreter’s job is therefore to identify the
contents of the list and check the disputed actions of government officials
against that list.
Originalism has instead recently emphasized the value of fidelity to the
constitutional text as its driving principle. The goal of constitutional
interpretation is not to restrict the text to the most manageable, easily
applied, or majority-favoring rules. The goal is to faithfully reproduce what
the constitutional text requires. Textual rules need not be narrow. The
breadth of the rule is determined by the embodied principle, not an a priori
commitment to narrowness.
It is entirely possible for constitutional drafters to establish general or
abstract rules or to prefer broad standards over narrow rules. Although such
broadly worded rules may provide less guidance to later interpreters than
narrowly crafted rules, they are not therefore without content. The Equal
Protection Clause has a meaning that can be interpreted and applied (though
perhaps with less certainty), even if it is framed more broadly than the rules
regarding the eligibility of candidates for presidential office.
54. Even so, having inferred from various pieces of evidence what the meaning of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is, the adjudicator might still conclude that the
Founders were mistaken in thinking that the death penalty and the constitutional provision
could be reconciled in a principled way. The burden for making out such an argument
would necessarily be heavy, however.
55. SCALIA, supra note 6, at 23.
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The distinction between broad and abstract constitutional principles and
narrow and specific constitutional rules is perhaps most familiar from the
work of Ronald Dworkin. For Dworkin, the Constitution spoke most
importantly in “majestic abstraction.”56 A Dworkinian interpreter would
provide an “abstract, principled, moral reading” of the text, rather than “a
concrete, dated reading.”57 There may be difficulties with Dworkin’s
particular approach to the distinction, but he usefully reminds us of the
possibility of intended principles. Constitutional rules are not confined to
the choice between long or short lists of specific applications. Broad
language may well be used to convey specifically chosen, content-rich
commitments. Jack Balkin notes that constitutions employ a complex
“linguistic technology of regulation and constraint.”58
The text of our Constitution contains different kinds of language. It
contains determinate rules. . . . It contains standards. . . . And it contains
principles. . . . If the text states a determinate rule, we must apply the rule
because that is what the text offers us. If it states a standard, we must
apply the standard. And if it states a general principle, we must apply the
principle.59

Balkin observes that standards and principles “do not constrain people in
the same way that rules do,” but that is not to say that they do not constrain
or do not have a discoverable content.60
It is also possible for constitutional drafters to simply delegate discretion
to later government officials. As originalists have long recognized (and
sometimes even emphasized), the power-granting provisions of the
Constitution are designed to give the legislative and executive branches
discretionary authority to make policy and the necessary tools to implement
those policies. By the same token, it is at least conceptually possible to
recognize that constitutional drafters might similarly empower judges
through constitutional provisions that authorize them to exercise substantial
discretion. With a primary commitment to constitutional fidelity (rather
than, for example, the restraint of judicial discretion), originalists have at
least accepted the possibility of textual provisions embodying broad
standards. The breadth of any given constitutional commitment and the
extent to which it delegates discretionary authority are ultimately empirical
questions to be resolved through the examination of the text.

56. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 145 (1993).
57. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1997).
58. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 43 (2011).
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 43. Balkin’s elaboration of the idea of textual principles suggests that
principles are largely delegations to future decisionmakers. One does not have to go that far
to embrace the notion that the text may embody standards that cover a wider array of
situations, provide less concrete guidance, and require more “practical reasoning” than rules
do. See id. at 349 n.12. Balkin would read the relevance of what he calls “historical
principles or historical standards” differently than I would. Id. at 40.
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4. Constitutional Pluralism
One of the significant new critiques of originalism that has emerged in
recent years has been the charge that the current judicial practice does not
reflect originalist commitments.61
To the extent that normative
constitutional theory should be concerned with legitimatizing how judicial
review is currently exercised, a theoretical position that does not describe
current reality would be problematic.62 There are a variety of ways in
which this sort of critique can be framed, but here, I am concerned with a
particular aspect of the argument. It is frequently observed that American
constitutional jurisprudence is descriptively “pluralistic” in its
methodological approach.63 There are various ways of mapping the
argumentative terrain in contemporary American constitutional discourse,
but one prominent typology identifies six common modalities of
constitutional argumentation that are apparently accepted as legitimate by
practitioners, including historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural,
and ethical arguments.64 Any theory that elevates a single modality of
constitutional argumentation as its centerpiece, therefore, would seem to
run into some difficulty with reconciling its recommendation of
argumentative monism with an accepted practice of argumentative
pluralism.
I believe that most current originalists sidestep the main force of this
distinctive critique.65 Arguments about original meaning are usually
characterized as one among many that interpreters might reasonably employ
to elucidate the meaning of the Constitution and develop the content of
constitutional law.66 To what extent, therefore, does originalist theory
recommend that judges and others lay down the various interpretive tools
with which they are familiar and employ only one historical method? From
an originalist perspective, is it inappropriate and illegitimate for judges and
other constitutional interpreters to make use of a range of argumentative
modalities when attempting to ascertain constitutional meaning? There is a
place for pluralism within originalism, but originalist theory would argue
61. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185,
1195.
62. A weaker version of this concern would suggest that the empirical reality should at
least be recognizably related to any credible normative theory such that it is possible to see
how plausible reform might bring the two into alignment. If descriptive and normative
theories are apparently unrelated to one another, then we might waive the latter away as
mere utopianism.
63. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 23–24 (1982); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1189 (1987); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1753 (1994).
64. BOBBITT, supra note 63, at 23–24.
65. The aspect of this critique that still bites originalism joins with other arguments
contending that original meaning is not authoritative for purposes of guiding the formation
of constitutional doctrine. This general argument is discussed below.
66. The argument in this section borrows from Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism
Within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM 70 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W.
Miller eds., 2011).
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that such a wide array of argumentative modalities should be carefully
disciplined by the overarching interpretive enterprise. Originalism is less
about method or form of argument than about interpretive purpose.
The originalist project is committed to uncovering, to the degree
possible, the meaning of the rule or principle that those who were
authorized to create the Constitution meant to communicate, not to making
use of any particular form of constitutional argument. Arguments
marshaling historical evidence about Framers’ intent and original meaning
and drawing on sources such as ratification convention debates or early
constitutional commentary are the obvious form that originalist arguments
are expected to take. They provide the clearest examples of the originalist
modality for creating and illustrating typologies of constitutional
argumentation, and they provide the most direct basis for considering the
acceptability and authoritativeness of referencing original meaning in order
to resolve current constitutional disputes.
But if the goal of the interpretive enterprise, for originalists, is to
discover the meaning that the author was attempting to convey through the
text, then the interpreter should not have strong precommitments regarding
the type of evidence that might be helpful for discovering and
understanding that meaning. Originalists are committed to an interpretive
effort, not an argumentative form. When available and illuminating,
classically historical arguments should no doubt be given great weight. But
historical materials as such are likely to tell only part of the story. Relevant
materials may not be particularly probative of the specific issues that are of
concern to us, or may in themselves leave substantial indeterminacies to be
resolved as to what the constitutional meaning might be.
Other modalities of constitutional argumentation may also be deployed
within an originalist framework. It is no accident that Robert Bork, for
example, tended to speak of originalists being focused on the “text,
structure, and history of the Constitution.”67 Exclusive reliance on external,
historical evidence as such was never thought to be the defining feature of
originalism. The text of the Constitution is quite appropriately the first
piece of evidence that an originalist would consult in interpreting the
document, and both Scalia and Solum characterize originalism as a form of
textualism.68 A close textual analysis of the words and phrases that were
actually chosen for inclusion in the Constitution, the relationships among
them, and their relationship to other texts is a ready starting point for
originalist analysis. An originalist might well expect that the words in the
text have a “plain meaning” that is readily accessible, and would certainly
expect that the words in the text convey meaning and would be
67. Bork, supra note 47, at 826; see also Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of
Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the
Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1273 (1997) (advocating adherence to
“commitments made by the people in the past, and embodied in text, history, tradition, and
precedent”).
68. See SCALIA, supra note 6; Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting, 44 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 123 (2007).
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comprehensible to appropriate audiences even without extrinsic interpretive
aids (such as access to convention debates). Framing originalism in terms
of original meaning (rather than original intent) has put even greater
emphasis on the text as an independent bearer of original meaning.
For similar reasons, arguments grounded in structures or values implicit
in or embedded in the constitutional scheme or language are likewise fair
game for originalists. Originalist arguments need not be clause-bound.
Arguments drawn from the design of the Constitution, the background
assumptions of the Constitution, or even the “ethos” or traditions of the
people may well be appropriate from an originalist standpoint, so long as
the aim is to illuminate the meaning of the constitutional rules put in place
by those who created the document. Examining the constitutional design
for clues about original constitutional meaning is, in principle, as useful as
examining the constitutional text.
Doctrinal arguments are perhaps the most common form of constitutional
argumentation in contemporary legal and judicial practice. There are good
reasons why this should be the case, and originalist theory does not suggest
that doctrinal arguments should not predominate in most legal decisions.
Precedent provides intellectual shortcuts for thinking about the meaning of
a law and how it might be applied to a range of common problems. A case
of first impression may require examining the full range of messy
arguments relating to constitutional meaning, but over time, precedent
should have distilled those arguments down to a set of more reliable and
accepted conclusions. For Supreme Court justices, as much as for lower
court judges or executive branch officials, doctrine provides an easy to
follow and more detailed constitutional rulebook that does not require
mastering and synthesizing a wide array of materials and arguments for
every case or problem that might arise.
Precedent translates the
Constitution into ubiquitous and accessible constitutional rules, and most
constitutional cases are really disputes about routine administration of those
agreed-upon rules of our baseline constitutional understandings. For most
legal disputes involving the Constitution, we are primarily concerned with
constitutional administration, applying what we have already learned from
earlier disputes. The goal is not to return to first principles and to get the
meaning of the Constitution itself right. Such cases are concerned with
clarifying the meaning and implication of judicial doctrine. They assume
that the doctrine correctly and adequately conveys constitutional meaning.
Yet the way in which originalists make use of a plurality of
argumentative forms may still be distinctive. The various arguments and
evidence adduced by an originalist serve the particular function of
advancing our ability to understand and apply the original meaning of the
Constitution. The various modalities of constitutional argument are
tethered to the originalist enterprise. An originalist would therefore resist
any independent normative force that such argumentative approaches might
have. The array of constitutional arguments can be used to clarify original
meaning, not trump identifiable original meaning. To the extent that such
argumentative modalities lead us away from, rather than toward, original
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meaning, then, to borrow from Justice Clarence Thomas, the originalist
would have to conclude that “[s]omething has gone seriously awry with this
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.”69
B. Judicial Restraint
The commitment to judicial restraint is distinct from the commitment to
an originalist interpretive approach. The former is focused on when judicial
review ought to be exercised and the relative authority of legislatures and
courts. The latter is focused on how constitutional meaning is understood.
Although a preference for judicial restraint might lead one naturally to
originalism as an interpretive approach, the acceptance of originalism as an
interpretive approach has no necessary implications for judicial restraint.
The separation of judicial restraint from originalism is one of the more
distinctive features of the recent originalist literature. Advocates of
originalism during the Reagan era were almost uniformly also advocates of
judicial restraint, and the two commitments were often conflated in both
scholarly and popular discourse. Reflecting an inherited New Deal
sensibility, this originalism was a vehicle for empowering popular
majorities by preventing judges from behaving as superlegislatures.70
Originalism was a tool of majoritarian democrats.
There is nothing like the same level of agreement within the recent
originalist literature on the desirability of judicial restraint. Rather, there is
agreement on the separation between interpretive approach and judicial
posture. Within that open space, originalists have recently taken a variety
of positions, from continuing to advocate judicial restraint71 to embracing a
more active exercise of the power of judicial review.72 But the primary
virtue now claimed by originalism is one of constitutional fidelity, not of
judicial restraint or democratic majoritarianism.
In order to elaborate more fully on the separation between originalism
and judicial restraint, we should distinguish between two distinct ideas that
are often referenced by the common term of “judicial restraint.” The first
idea might be referred to as “judicial discretion” and concerns the degree of
choice and will in judicial decisionmaking. The second idea might be
referred to as “judicial deference” and concerns how tentative judges should
be in striking down legislation as unconstitutional. Neither idea follows
inevitably from a commitment to originalism.
1. Judicial Discretion
Excessive judicial discretion has been a recurring concern in American
political history. Politicians and scholars alike have worried that judges
have too many opportunities to express their individual moral and political
69. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 518 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. See Whittington, supra note 15, at 602–03.
71. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2005).
72. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004).
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preferences while conducting their official duties. Rather than faithfully
adhering to constitutional requirements, judges may be “tempted” to use
their position to advance favored policies at the expense of the law.73 The
challenge would then be to find a way to constrain judges just as judges
attempt to constrain other government officials. An originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation was offered as a potential solution to this
problem by delimiting how judges make decisions.
The hope that a public commitment to originalism would force judges to
restrain themselves and limit their discretion would seem to have been
overly optimistic.74 As a practical matter, no interpretive method is likely
to restrict discretion in judicial decisionmaking, and originalism is unlikely
to perform any better in this regard than various other approaches to
constitutional interpretation. To the extent that we are worried about willful
judges rendering arbitrary decisions, most interpretive methods offer the
means for criticizing such judges. As constitutional theory has blossomed,
it has become more apparent that constitutional adjudication is
characterized more by normative disagreement than bad faith, and
normative disagreement in turn can be rooted in theoretical disagreement.
A faithful Dworkinian can be self-restrained by her interpretive method,
and be subjected to scrutiny and criticism for failure to appropriately apply
the favored method. The apparent abuse of discretion is more likely to be
attributable to what Jeremy Waldron has called the “circumstances of
politics” that comes from good-faith disagreements over what is to be done
than to willfulness.75 Limiting judicial discretion has rarely been offered as
a compelling justification for the adoption of originalism in the recent
literature.
2. Judicial Deference
The willingness of judges to interpose their constitutional judgments in
policy disputes and to block the implementation of politically determined
public policies has been a further source of persistent debate. The first
wave of the modern originalist literature came in response to the
constitutional decisions of the Warren Court and early Burger Court,76 and
was developed from a critical stance. The Supreme Court justices were
seen as unduly activist—too willing to exercise the power of judicial review
and nullify state and federal policies. Originalism was seen by many to be a
solution to that problem. Advocacy of originalism often went hand-in-hand

73. BORK, supra note 5, at 2.
74. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 33–59 (2012).
75. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 102 (1999). The inherent difficulty of
the judicial task and core indeterminacies in the constitutional text are also likely to breed
disagreements, even if a hegemony of a single interpretive method could be established.
Good-faith originalists will also come to different answers for difficult constitutional
questions.
76. The Warren Court lasted from 1953 to 1969. The Burger Court followed and its first
few years continued to embody many of the liberal impulses that characterized the Warren
Court.
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with a strong Thayerian deference,77 which urged judges to strike down
statutes only in the most extreme cases when no reasonable defense of the
laws could be offered. Both the substantive content of the original
Constitution and the high information requirements for an originalist judge
to reach clear conclusions about constitutional meaning suggested to early
originalists that democratic majorities would be empowered to act.
The recent literature has had a different emphasis. There is now a
widespread emphasis on the centrality of constitutional fidelity to the
originalist project, rather than the centrality of judicial restraint. If the
primary commitment of originalist theory is to maintain the inherited
constitutional rule against the temptations to deviate from it or alter it, then
the tendency of the judiciary to uphold or strike down political actions must
be purely contingent. The stringency of constitutional requirements and the
decisions of political actors will determine the extent to which an originalist
court will actively strike down legislation. Upholding the constitutional
rule, as originally understood, may or may not require upholding
contemporary legislation.
A commitment to judicial deference is a potential add-on to an originalist
theory of constitutional interpretation. As such, it might be independently
justified as a value that is unrelated to originalism but is nonetheless worth
adopting. There is little consensus among current originalists that a general
principle of judicial deference is separately attractive. Indeed, many would
regard judicial deference as subversive of the primary commitment of
originalism to identify and adhere to the original meaning of the
Constitution.
Judicial deference may nonetheless be regarded as implicit in a
commitment to originalism rather than a separate normative principle. Few
recent originalists have made such an argument, but unpacking that
possibility is worthwhile. Three possible angles seem most likely to be
productive. First, the Constitution might itself be thought to embody
democratic majoritarianism. To the extent that the text entrusts democratic
majorities with extensive powers to make public policy, then the judiciary
would have little authority to stand in their way. Such a reading of the
Constitution seems implausible, however. Although some specific features
of the Constitution are clearly designed to give policymaking flexibility to
elected officials, others delimit that authority and impose constraints on
political power. A generalized policy of judicial deference to the actions of
government officials does not seem consistent with that “Madisonian”
balance.78 Second, the clear mistake rule might itself be part of original
meaning of a textual provision of the Constitution. James Bradley Thayer
spent much of his classic article making out something like that argument,
though he emphasized early jurisprudential traditions more than original
77. Thayerian deference emphasizes a “clear mistake” rule for when statutes of doubtful
constitutionality should be struck down, as advanced most influentially in James Bradley
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129 (1893).
78. BORK, supra note 5, at 139.
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textual commitments as such.79 But others have found little evidence that
the original meaning of the Constitution directs the Court to adopt such a
restrictive reading of its own powers.80 Third, we might think that proper
respect for the constitutional judgment of elected officials demands that
judges defer to them. But to the extent that the very practice of judicial
review follows from the judiciary’s duty to interpret and apply the law of
the Constitution, judges would seem to be obliged to follow their own
judgment about the law’s meaning rather than defer to the judgment of
others. While judges should perhaps be modest about the strength of their
own insights into constitutional meaning, that humility suggests that they
should learn from others and not simply accept the conclusions that others
have reached.81 On the whole, the case for judicial deference would seem
to rest in a separate normative argument, rather than being implicit in
originalism or the original Constitution itself. There is little agreement
among originalists that courts should be especially deferential when
exercising the power of judicial review.
II. POINTS OF CONTENTION
Recent originalists do not, of course, agree on every point of originalist
theory. While there are important points of agreement, many of which both
unite recent advocates of originalism and distinguish them from key
features of older versions of originalism, there remain points of internal
contestation. These continuing points of contention emphasize the fact that
originalist theory remains a work in progress and that adjustments and
refinements in the theory are likely to occur in the future, just as they have
in the past.82
A. Justifications for Originalism
One area in which agreement has not yet been reached is in identifying
the best justification for adopting an originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation. There has at least been some winnowing down of the
options, and some justifications for originalism that were once under active
consideration now receive relatively little attention. The idea that
originalism is justified by a commitment to judicial restraint has already
been mentioned. For a generation concerned with reining in the Warren
Court, a chief attraction of originalism was that it seemed to make plain the
79. See Thayer, supra note 77.
80. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Judicial Power, 12 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 115 (2004).
81. See McConnell, supra note 67, at 1292–93.
82. Perhaps it goes without saying that originalists will no doubt disagree among
themselves about the actual content of the Constitution. Although such interpretive
disagreements might derive from theoretical disagreements, they are more likely to derive
from simply different approaches to and evaluation of the available evidence about original
meaning, and are, potentially, resolvable within the confines of originalist theory. Balkin,
for example, may reach rather different results about the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment than Scalia, but much of the interesting disagreement comes at the level of
interpretation rather than theory.
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Court’s errors, and held some promise of preventing judges from making
the same errors in the future. In recent years, the desire to restrain the
courts has not had a prominent place in academic defenses of originalism.83
There also now appears to be substantial agreement that the best
justification for originalism will not itself be historical. The significance of
the “interpretive intentions” of the Founders in mandating that current
interpreters adopt an originalist philosophy was, most notably, aggressively
advocated by Raoul Berger.84 The argument for interpretive intentions has
played relatively little role in the originalist literature of the past two
decades. The shift away from trying to root originalist theory in
interpretive intentions has been driven less by a belief that the Founding
generation did not itself accept some form of originalism and more by the
conviction that interpretive intentions are ultimately irrelevant for
evaluating contemporary normative theories of constitutional interpretation
and adjudication. The Founders may well have embraced originalism
themselves, but such evidence will not do much to advance the argument
for originalism.
Three considerations might be noted in pointing to the irrelevance of
interpretive intentions for originalist theory. First, we might think of
interpretive intentions as a form of expected applications. As noted above,
the authoritativeness of original expectations about the applications
associated with the adoption and implementation of a given constitutional
rule have been generally rejected in originalist theory. Rather, it is the
original meaning of the substantive content of the rule (as distinct from the
expected consequences of the rule) that is the target for originalist inquiries.
The Founders might well have expected that later interpreters would be
guided by their own understandings of the Constitution, but such
expectations would have been grounded in general theories about judicial
decisionmaking and legal interpretation and could well be disappointed
without doing damage to the embodied meaning of the text itself. The
Founders might have expected that the federal judiciary would often or
rarely strike down laws as unconstitutional, would play an important or a
minor role in federal policymaking, would deploy a wide range of legal
tools to enforce and implement their judgments, or would have few tools
available. Such ideas about how the practice of constitutional dispute
resolution and adjudication would play out under the constitutional text
could be either prescient or myopic, but they are not authoritative.
Second, interpretive intentions are not themselves embodied in a textual
constitutional rule. It seems plausible that the Founders could have
entrenched a particular interpretive approach to the Constitution by
including a textual instruction to future interpreters. From an originalist
83. The place of originalism in popular discourse may rest on a different footing. See
Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009).
84. Raoul Berger, “Original Intention” in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 296 (1986). This justification for originalism was likewise aggressively attacked by
critics. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
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perspective at least, such a text-based second-order rule would be as
authoritative and binding as any other constitutional rule, only in this case
the rule would direct and constrain interpreters rather than directing and
constraining the substantive exercise of political power by government
officials. The Constitution, however, contains very few explicit interpretive
guidelines, and nothing that speaks to the general interpretive approach to
be taken toward the document.85 Any interpretive intentions that the
Founders might have had regarding the Constitution were left at the level of
background assumptions and expectations about future behavior.86 An
emphasis on original meaning would lead us to ask where those interpretive
intentions appear in the Constitution itself—to ask what aspect of the
Constitution (whether textual provision or structural principle) conveys a
constitutional rule that all constitutional rules should be interpreted
according to their original meaning. The Constitution seems to lack such an
element.87
Finally, reliance on any interpretive intentions of the Founders as
sufficient grounding for an interpretive theory seems inadequate. Any
normative theory regarding constitutional interpretation and adjudication
requires an explanation of why current political actors should regard that
theory as compelling. Reliance on the factual existence of interpretive
intentions is liable to appear circular, asking current political actors to bind
themselves to the original meaning of the Constitution because such a
practice would have the original meaning of the Constitution. Ultimately,
we would want a theory to justify and explain the desirability of
constitutional fidelity and the exercise of judicial review. Why should we
follow this set of constitutional rules (the set of constitutional rules
contained in the original meaning of the text) rather than some other?
Justifying any particular approach requires normative argumentation, not
appeal to authority. We cannot bootstrap our way to an interpretative
theory.
If there is mostly agreement in the current originalist literature on the
need for a normative theory (other than the instrumental desire to restrain
the courts) to justify the adoption of originalism, there is disagreement on
what that theory should be. Proponents of originalism have in recent years
developed a variety of alternative justifications for the theory, and at least
for the moment these alternatives have not yet been reconciled with one
another or reduced to a common core.

85. The Ninth Amendment and Eleventh Amendment represent exceptions to this
general pattern, being framed explicitly as directions to future interpreters.
86. There might be a case for discovering commitments regarding legal interpretation
implicit in the “judicial power” delegated in Article III, but such a case has yet to be made.
87. I have argued that originalism is most consistent with a core structural feature of
American constitutionalism, the existence of a written fundamental law drafted and ratified
by popularly elected assemblies. WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 50–59. I do believe that
any persuasive interpretive theory must take account of and be reconcilable with this design
feature, but I would not go so far as to argue that this structural feature embodies a clear set
of interpretive intentions.
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One approach is to justify originalism by reference to the likely political
and policy outcomes to be generated by this approach to constitutional
interpretation.88 Cass Sunstein suggests that a consideration of outcomes
always drives approaches to judicial review.89 At the very least, we might
imagine that the quality of the policy outcomes likely to be generated by a
given normative constitutional theory has to be measured against some
baseline of political legitimacy before we would be willing to take such a
theory seriously.90 An approach to constitutional interpretation that
systematically generates unjust results would be hard to sustain, and would
eventually call into question either the interpretive approach or the
fundamental law itself.91 The range of tolerable outcomes at least provides
bounds on acceptable constitutional rules.
But some would go further and argue that originalism provides positively
attractive substantive policy outcomes. We might simply imagine that the
Constitution is particularly well written, such that its faithful interpretation
and implementation will lead to desirable results.92 A more intriguing
possibility has been suggested by John O. McGinnis and Michael B.
Rappaport.93 Rather than suggesting that the Constitution just happens to
be an excellent one, they argue that the constitution-creating procedures
characteristic of American constitutionalism systematically produce good
constitutional rules. Of particular significance for them is the use of
supermajority rules for higher lawmaking in the United States. Such rules
ensure that constitutional provisions will command widespread support and
thus tend to enhance the general welfare. Faithfully enforcing rules that
have been vetted and approved through such procedures will, they contend,
generate better political and policy outcomes than substituting rules that
have not survived such a gauntlet.
88. The desire to generate judicial restraint is, in effect, a variation of this strategy. The
desirable policy outcome is one in which courts seldom interfere with public policy
decisions and general innovative policies (or constitutional rules) of their own, and the
recommended strategy to achieve this result is the adoption of originalism as a means for
achieving judicial self-restraint. This is a perfectly sound strategy for justifying the theory,
but in practice few now believe that generalized judicial restraint is an attractive goal to
pursue or that originalism is a particularly well-suited instrument for achieving that goal.
89. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 20–23 (2009).
90. Much turns on how high the normative baseline of legitimacy is against which an
actual constitution is to be measured. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 86–87; Randy E.
Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (2003); Mark A. Graber, Our
(Im)Perfect Constitution, 51 REV. POL. 86 (1989).
91. One might well ask whether it would be preferable to challenge the constitutional
text itself rather than the effort to faithfully apply that text, but as a pragmatic matter a theory
of constitutional interpretation that produces unacceptably bad results is unlikely to be
politically sustainable. On the problem of deeply flawed constitutions, see J.M. Balkin,
Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703 (1997),
and Mark A. Graber, Why Interpret? Political Justification and American Constitutionalism,
56 REV. POL. 415 (1994).
92. Sunstein posits the hypothetical possibility of a “Scalialand” in which “the original
public meaning of the Constitution is quite excellent,” and in which the “excellence of the
Constitution” justifies an originalist approach. SUNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 21.
93. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION (2013).
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The supermajoritarian argument has the advantage of providing a
rationale for expecting that an originalist constitution might provide
superior results to constitutional rules elaborated in other ways. But this
sort of argument rests normative constitutional theory squarely on an
evaluation of political outcomes. Although we might have some reason to
think that supermajority adoption rules are likely to produce some desirable
features in public policy, the advantages of strict reliance on supermajority
rules do not come without some costs. Such rules introduce substantial
status quo bias into the constitutional or political system, and such a bias
may not always be welfare enhancing. Resting the justification for
enforcing constitutional rules on the quality of the outcomes resulting from
them may also invite specific departures from an originalist constitution.
Even if supermajority procedures generally produce high-quality rules, it
might well be possible to identify exceptions (of either omission or
commission) where better results could be achieved by substituting a rule
that had not emerged from such a process. The very justification for
originalism might therefore authorize departures from originalism.
Alternatively, one might view liberty to be the highest priority of
constitutionalism. The best approach to the exercise of judicial review and
the interpretation of constitutional rules, therefore, might be driven by
considerations of enhancing liberty. Dworkin’s constitutional theory is
reflective of this type of orientation. For Dworkin, an emphasis on rightsenhancement was most consistent with a “moral reading” of the
Constitution, in which constitutional interpreters seek to make the
Constitution as compatible as possible with the demands of moral
philosophy.94 Dworkin was famously critical of originalism and would
hardly conclude that an originalist constitution maximizes liberty.95
Nonetheless, a Dworkinian theory might conclude either that the original
Constitution we happen to have is, in fact, liberty maximizing, or that an
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is compatible with
efforts to reconcile the demands of fit and justification in constitutional
jurisprudence.96
Deriving originalism from a primary commitment to rights
foundationalism is complicated, but not impossible. Such a justification for
originalism is not without its difficulties. Most efforts to construct
constitutional theories on the base of rights foundationalism do not
routinely lead to the conclusion that originalism is the preferred approach.97
Grounding originalism in such a justificatory approach would entail
defending not only the adoption of a rights-oriented theory, but also the
specific conclusion that originalism is the best instantiation of such a
theory. Complicating that final conclusion is the possibility that originalism
94. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 2–3 (1996).
95. Id. at 13–14.
96. From different political directions, the originalist theories of Balkin and Barnett
show some Dworkinian inspirations. See BALKIN, supra note 58; BARNETT, supra note 72.
97. For a critical discussion of such theories, see WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 27–32.
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might not always maximize rights. To the extent that in any particular
instance rights could be further enhanced by departing from the original
meaning of the Constitution, a rights-foundationalist argument might well
suggest that such a departure should be made. Again, originalism would
seem to be purely contingent when grounded on this sort of justification.
The potential tensions between the original meaning of the constitutional
text and the conclusions of a moral reading of the Constitution might derive
from the apparent deficiencies of the original meaning (from the perspective
of moral philosophy), but also from the competing objectives of
constitutionalism. The protection of individual rights might be a core
commitment of constitutionalism, but it is not the only purpose that
constitutions are meant to serve. Constitutions are also concerned with
structuring and empowering government and coordinating political action.98
The various purposes that constitutions are designed to serve may require
compromises and adjustments, and a single-minded focus on enhancing
rights might conflict with, rather than realize, the features and commitments
of the original meaning of the Constitution.
Finally, originalism has been justified by process-based considerations.
Under this approach, pursing the original meaning of the Constitution is
justified by the special status of the authorized lawmakers who established
the fundamental rules to govern the polity. Only those lawmakers were
democratically authorized to create fundamental law, and the goal of
constitutional interpretation therefore should be to uncover the content of
the rules laid down by those lawmakers and faithfully apply them. Drafting
text for a written constitution allows for public deliberation and choice
about the desired content of the fundamental law. Originalism refers back
to that deliberate choice and seeks to understand the substance, and not
merely the form, of the rule that was adopted. Originalism directs
interpreters to defer to the authorized lawgiver, rather than deliberate anew
on what might be desirable constitutional rules.
This justificatory strategy is particularly concerned with judges as
constitutional interpreters. Normative constitutional theory is regularly
focused on constitutional interpretation within a specific institutional
context and for a specific purpose: the exercise of the power of
constitutional review by judges to nullify or uphold legislative policy. The
challenge is to explain the basis on which judges may exercise such an
authority to overturn public policy endorsed by democratic institutions.
Originalism points to the limited warrants on which government officials
make policy to coerce social actors—warrants that are established in the
same constitutional text that judges are called upon to interpret and enforce.
The authority of legislators to make legitimate laws with binding force
ultimately depends on the scope of their public office. Government
officials are chosen to make policy within the limited scope of their
predefined legal authority. The power of judicial review in a particular case
98. 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 5–10 (2013); Keith E. Whittington, Recovering “from the State of
Imbecility,” 84 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1574–81 (2006).
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is merely an inference from the general judicial duty to apply the law
correctly and appropriately to the case at hand.99 Judges are justified in
ignoring the dictates of a statute only when the statute conflicts with the
superior authority of the Constitution. Judicial action properly trumps
legislative action only to the extent that the judicial action is properly
grounded in the higher law endorsed by the people.100 By orienting judges
to the original meaning of the Constitution as they exercise the power of
judicial review, originalism preserves the ultimate authority of democratic
decisionmakers to determine the content of the fundamental law.101
B. The Relationship Between Originalism and Judicial Review
The theory of originalism may have been motivated by the particular
practice and problems of judicial review and the judicial elaboration of
constitutional law, but originalism is not itself a theory of constitutional
adjudication. Originalism offers an argument about how the Constitution
should be interpreted. Originalism is at least distinguishable from
arguments about how courts ought to exercise the power of judicial review
and what use courts ought to make of the Constitution while conducting
their duties. Given that originalism only partly covers the ground that is of
interest to normative constitutional theory, it is no surprise that originalists
continue to differ among themselves over how courts ought to exercise the
power of judicial review and what the implications of the originalist logic
might be for judicial interpreters in particular.102
Most immediately, if not most obviously, originalists continue to
disagree about whether courts are limited to constitutional interpretation.
Originalist theory contends that a political actor engaging in constitutional
interpretation ought to search for the original meaning of the constitutional
text. Originalist theory, narrowly construed, does not tell us whether judges
should engage in constitutional interpretation or whether judges are limited
to constitutional interpretation when evaluating the constitutionality of a
law or resolving a constitutional dispute. Establishing what is to be done
when judges engage in judicial review requires a distinct normative
argument that only partly overlaps with the kinds of justificatory strategies
and interpretive contentions outlined above.
There are, of course, some natural points of tangency between a theory of
originalism and a theory of constitutional adjudication. Many of the
justifications for adopting originalism are aimed at judges and have in mind
the practice of judicial review. If originalist interpretation generates better
99. Philip Hamburger elaborates on the notion of judicial duty and its implications for
constitutional law. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).
100. On the basic logic of a dualist democratic system, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE (1993), and WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 135–42.
101. This point is developed at greater length in WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 152–59.
102. Solum, for example, is more modest in his ambitions than most in explicitly
delimiting his inquiry to the nature of constitutional interpretation and declaring neutrality on
contested normative issues of what judges ought to do. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic
Originalism (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers
Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.

2013]

ORIGINALISM: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION

401

policy outcomes, optimizes liberty, or preserves democratic
decisionmaking, then this would serve to recommend originalism to judges.
Given a particular concern with the interpretation of legal texts and the
process of the authoritative resolution of disputes, originalist theory seeks to
clarify and guide the general practice of legal interpretation (while saying
little about the interpretive process of such different enterprises as literary
criticism or Biblical exegesis). To the extent that judicial review as an
ongoing political practice is understood to be a practice of constitutional
interpretation and justified on the basis of the faithful interpretation of the
fundamental law, then originalism works to make plain and refine those
implicit commitments of existing legal practice.
But there are many issues of constitutional adjudication and dispute
resolution that do not fall so neatly within the ambit of originalist theory.
What remedies can courts properly deploy when they are confronted with
constitutional violations? What sorts of disputes are properly subject to
judicial intervention and resolution? Are courts limited to constitutional
interpretation when deciding how to respond to political disputes that have
come before them? May judges, for example, decide to ignore a
constitutional rule that seems obsolete or unworkable?103 May judges take
action to resolve a political problem even when the Constitution is silent or
unclear? Would the Supreme Court’s decisions in Brown v. Board of
Education,104 Gray v. Sanders,105 or Bush v. Gore106 be justifiable even if
they could not be grounded in constitutional interpretation?107 What
standard of certainty must judges reach before determining to act on their
perception of a constitutional violation against the constitutional judgments
of other government officials? Does the Constitution form the sum total of
the fundamental law to be interpreted and applied by the courts, or may
judges also make use of such materials as natural law or a judicially created
common law as sources of constitutional law? Originalism may hold some
inherent answers to those questions, but there is room for disagreement
among originalists over how such questions should be answered and there is
as yet little agreement among originalists over such broader questions of
constitutional adjudication.
An unsettled, related question has commanded more attention within the
originalist literature: how much respect judges should pay to judicial
precedents that are apparently inconsistent with the original meaning of the
Constitution. Originalist theory would indicate that the original meaning is
103. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question in Constitutional Law, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1997) (examining the possibility of this sort of constitutional failure); Keith E.
Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093 (2001)
(same).
104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
105. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
106. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
107. See Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A
Diagnosis and Prescription, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 218 (Ian Shapiro & Robert
Adams eds., 1998) (examining the possibility of an extraordinary judicial prerogative
power).

402

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

authoritative in constitutional interpretation, not subsequent judicial
decisions that sought to apply the Constitution. Likewise, I argue above
that judicial doctrines and doctrinal analysis might be useful from an
originalist perspective in conveying the accumulated understanding of
judges on what the Constitution means and how it should be applied, and in
assisting judges in administering constitutional rules for purposes of day-today legal adjudication. But originalist theory does not necessarily resolve
the question of whether judicial precedent should be taken as an
authoritative source of law that might supplement or trump the
constitutional text. Originalist theory, as such, also does not definitively
instruct judges on what they should do if they find themselves confronted
with a legal and political status quo that already departs substantially from
the original meaning of the constitutional text.
The potential tensions between judicial precedent and original meaning
are only of academic interest if the body of constitutional law can be
reconciled with the original meaning of the Constitution. Some potential
conflicts may not matter if the relevant issues are unlikely to be raised in
justiciable cases, or if the questions are no longer politically salient. The
possibility of significant and salient conflicts between received judicial
doctrine and apparent constitutional original meaning, however, can hardly
be avoided entirely. Few would expect that originalism in practice would
simply validate the constitutional status quo in all its various parts and
details. Originalists have proposed a range of possible responses to this
situation. For some, judicial precedents should be held in high esteem and
current judges should normally defer to past decisions, even when they
would be decided differently as matters of first impression. In an otherwise
sympathetic account of originalism, Monaghan concluded “original
understanding must give way in the face of transformative or longstanding
precedent.”108 For others, a consequentialist approach to normative theory
would suggest a potentially intermediate position in which “precedent
doctrine should consist of rules that require precedent to be followed when
doing so would produce net benefits.”109 By contrast, Gary Lawson has
offered a more radical approach to precedent, concluding that a “court may
properly use precedent if, but only if, the precedent is the best available
evidence of the right answer to constitutional questions.”110 Arbitrating
among such alternatives depends both on the pragmatics of judging in an
imperfect world and on the proper relationship between originalist
constitutional interpretation and the sources of constitutional law.

108. Monaghan, supra note 37, at 724; see also BORK, supra note 5, at 155–59.
109. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and
Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 804 (2009); see also Lee J. Strang, An Originalist
Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent and the Common Good, 36
N.M. L. REV. 419 (2006).
110. Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5
AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 4 (2007); see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 168–74; Randy E.
Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It Sounds, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 257 (2005).
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There are also practical issues of applying originalist theory that remain
unresolved. Many recommendations about how best to pursue originalist
constitutional interpretation in particular contexts no doubt operate below
the level of theory, though best practices are likely to continue to emerge
through concrete efforts to understand constitutional provisions. Theory is
more likely to be relevant to some basic methodological issues. How
authoritative are the particular interpretive methods and frameworks that
were in place at the time of the Founding for later originalist interpreters?
Are original interpretive methods also embodied in the Constitution, or are
they dispensable features of a historic legal practice?111 Are legal canons
from the Founding era entrenched along with the constitutional text and
essential to forming a coherent original understanding of the text?112 How
should the common law background of the constitutional text be
interpreted?113 How should common background assumptions of the
Founding period be incorporated into the interpretation of the constitutional
text?114 Such issues have only begun to be explored in earnest.
Uncertainty and indeterminacy are inherent in the originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation. The evidence of the historical meaning of
particular provisions of the constitutional text may often be inadequate to
guide the modern interpreter. Constitutional provisions may have been
vague in their original usage, leaving uncertainty about how they should be
clarified or elaborated. The law may have gaps that do not adequately
guide political actors, even when action is necessary. Such considerations
suggest that there are limits to what constitutional interpretation can
accomplish.115
Originalists differ among themselves on how best to respond to this
uncertainty. One recent option has been to supplement originalist
constitutional
interpretation
with
nonoriginalist
constitutional
construction.116 Constitutional construction characterizes the constitutional
elaboration within the interstices of the discoverable meaning of the
constitutional text. Constructions perform important work by filling in gaps
of constitutional meaning and providing guidance for how political actors
should behave when original constitutional meaning is indeterminate. The
process of construction allows political actors to depart from known
constitutional meaning without violating constitutional meaning. Within

111. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009).
112. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519
(2003).
113. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551
(2006).
114. Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 615 (2009).
115. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 6–13, 204–19 (discussing the limits of
constitutional interpretation); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation–Construction
Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) (same); Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a
New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119 (2010) (same).
116. See, e.g., supra note 115.
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the “construction zone” of indeterminate constitutional meaning, political
actors creatively assemble new constitutional rules.117
Although embraced by some, the idea of constitutional construction has
not been universally accepted by advocates of originalism, and the
elaboration of the idea has not always been consistent among those who
endorse it. Some would emphasize that constructions should primarily be
pursued by political actors, while others suggest that courts should routinely
engage in significant constructions of constitutional meaning in order to
limit political actors.118 Of course, one possible response to the idea of
constructions is to deny that the meaning of the constitutional text is ever
indeterminate or that there is significant uncertainty in constitutional
interpretation. Perhaps all significant indeterminacies can be resolved
through sufficiently careful efforts at interpretation. This, however, seems
improbable. A more credible response is to suggest that there are other
options for addressing interpretive uncertainty other than construction. One
such option would suggest that a plethora of default rules could guide
constitutional interpreters in the face of uncertainty. A particularly
prominent default rule would be a rule that judges should defer to
legislators on disputed constitutional questions whenever constitutional
meaning is unclear. Rather than attempting to construct an effective
constitutional rule on their own, judges encountering indeterminacies in the
discoverable meaning of the Constitution might simply determine that, for
example, the actions of government officials should be upheld against
contested rights claims or that state authority should be upheld against the
contested actions of Congress.119 It remains to be seen whether such
options are sustainable as alternatives to the idea of constitutional
constructions or whether constructions will occupy a significant space
within originalist theory.
III. POINTS OF SEPARATION
There has been greater convergence between originalists and
nonoriginalists in recent years than when the originalism debates first
began.120 Whereas the early originalists were particularly concerned with
drawing contrasts between themselves and their critics, more recent
offerings in originalism have emphasized points of commonality between
originalist and nonoriginalist theories (and, in fact, have found more
common ground with nonoriginalists). At the same time, critics of
originalism have emphasized concerns with constitutional interpretation and
117. See Solum, supra note 115, at 108.
118. Compare BARNETT, supra note 72, at 118–30, with WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at
6–13.
119. Default rules are considered in greater detail in Whittington, supra note 115, at 130–
33.
120. I wish it went without saying that I do not believe that constitutional theory can
simply be reduced to this particular dichotomy between originalists and nonoriginalists.
There are a wide variety of approaches to constitutional theory beyond the confines of
originalism (and much disagreement among originalists), but for present purposes what is of
interest is the unity of other schools of thought in their criticism of originalism.
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historical meaning in ways that help bridge the gulf between them and
originalists.
Despite this growing common ground, there remain some notable points
of separation between originalists and their critics. There are still features
of originalist theory that remain unpalatable to nonoriginalists, and vice
versa. Originalists and nonoriginalists continue to build their normative
theories on distinct foundations and reach incompatible results. Even as we
try to clarify the points of agreement and contestation within the recent
originalist literature, it is worth bearing in mind what continues to separate
originalists from their critics and prevents an easy reconciliation. I
highlight two broad points of continued separation.
The first point of separation is that originalists remain far more optimistic
than their critics about how discernible or useful original meaning might be.
This is ultimately less of a theoretical disagreement than a practical one.
One can fully accept every feature of originalist theory, and yet still
conclude as an empirical matter that the particular constitution that one
seeks to interpret is largely indeterminate and vague—or at least is
indeterminate and vague relative to most of the legal issues that we happen
to find most salient. The original meaning of a text may be hopelessly lost
to us because the text in question is frustratingly vague, because the
historical evidence that might clarify its meaning is irredeemably corrupt or
missing, or for a variety of other reasons. For those who are pessimistic
about the recoverability of the original meaning of the constitutional text,
the proper response would lean less towards thinking that originalism is
flawed and more towards thinking that originalism is necessarily irrelevant
to contemporary constitutional practice.
There are three notes to be made regarding this point of separation
between originalists and their critics. First, while it is reasonable enough to
be skeptical about the ultimate value of an originalist inquiry for resolving
immediate constitutional disputes, such pessimism should ultimately be
supported by historical research. It is thus an empirical question whether
originalist efforts at interpretation of any given piece of text bear any fruit.
Both those who are optimistic about the value of originalist interpretation
and those who are pessimistic would do well to wait until the research has
been done before drawing any firm conclusions about how useful originalist
admonishments might be.
Second, when considering the possible utility of originalist interpretation
for resolving contemporary disputes, pessimists should bear in mind that the
relevant inquiry is into the original meaning of constitutional rules, not into
the historically expected applications of the textually embodied rule.
Expected applications are likely to become obsolete relatively quickly, not
because those inferences about the implications of the adopted rule are
likely to be flawed, but because the application of the rule to political
debates is likely to be narrow and time bound. The drafted text might itself
take such an obsolescent character. The particular fears of the Founding
generation led to the constitutional entrenchment of items such as the right
to a jury trial in civil cases involving more than twenty dollars and the
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prohibition on titles of nobility. As Richard Primus has emphasized,
constitutional rights and prohibitions are often the product of particular
political conflicts and experiences.121 The United States is relatively
fortunate that the drafters of the Constitution tended to frame the rules
somewhat abstractly, such that the Third Amendment is the exception rather
than the rule. Many of our constitutional rules may have grown out of the
Founders’ particular historical experiences, but the rules themselves
generally have broad implications for situations that the Founders never
imagined.122
Third, if originalist interpretive efforts prove fruitless, there still remains
the question of what is to be done in the face of such textual indeterminacy.
As we have seen, originalists disagree among themselves on this point.
Some would no doubt fall into the same camp as many critics of originalism
when considering what courts or political actors should do when the
original meaning of a constitutional provision runs out. Whether in such
circumstances judges should creatively generate rules of their own or defer
to the actions of elected officials is beyond the scope of a theory of
originalism per se and turns on a broader set of normative issues about the
scope of judicial power and how to govern in the face of constitutional
indeterminacy. The pessimist may simply believe that we more often find
ourselves in the “construction zone” than most originalists do.
The second important point of separation between originalists and their
critics is a theoretical one that goes to the heart of originalist theory: a
disagreement over how authoritative original meaning should be.
Specifically, this disagreement centers on Solum’s “fixation” and
“contribution” theses, and whether the meaning of a term is fixed at the
time that it is uttered, constraining the content of constitutional law. To
adhere to originalism necessarily requires adherence to those key features of
the theory, and these are features that still provoke objections from critics of
originalism, no matter how capacious such a theory of originalism might
be.123
There are a variety of concerns about originalism that might be grouped
under this heading. Broadly speaking, we might think that the original
meaning is only one component of the effective law. From this perspective,
the original meaning of the Constitution might be one factor to consider
when attempting to determine what the applicable law might be for
resolving a particular dispute, but the original meaning is not a hard
constraint on the formulation of a rule to be applied. Original meaning
might be one source of constitutional law, but it has no pride of place. The
development of constitutional law might not be the equivalent of
121. RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS (1999).
122. The concern that constitutional provisions may be framed or conceptualized so
narrowly that they have few implications outside their own context is distinct from a concern
that historically generated constitutional provisions may no longer seem like the correct rules
with which to govern.
123. This is why Dworkin ultimately could not embrace even his own reconstructed
version of originalism. Dworkin, supra note 57, at 1258 n.18.
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interpretation of the constitutional text, but may instead be a broader, more
wide-ranging process. Original meaning might therefore be integrated into
or balanced within the larger web of legal sources that must be considered
when attempting to ascertain the applicable constitutional rule.
Whether from a Dworkinian law-as-integrity perspective or a
constitutional pluralism perspective, we might think that judicial doctrine or
ideas of social justice have as much role in determining the content of the
law as the original meaning of the text as understood by those who laid
down that text. Is judicial precedent, for example, as authoritative as the
original meaning of the text in determining what the constitutional rules
might be? If precedents are as authoritative (or more so) than the original
meaning of the text, is this true only of particularly celebrated landmark
decisions or would it be equally true of run-of-the-mill judicial decisions?
Although such arguments might be pitched as critiques of the fixation thesis
(must the text mean what it originally meant?), they are perhaps more
telling when aimed at the contribution thesis (is constitutional law
determined by the original meaning of the text?). Is original meaning one
factor to be considered when identifying the constitutional rule; is original
meaning just one data point to be weighed in the balance with other,
potentially contradictory considerations? For originalists, the original
meaning must be a hard constraint on how constitutional law can develop.
For many nonoriginalists, the original meaning is simply one piece of
information to consider in determining how law should develop.
Critics of originalism have suggested a range of considerations that might
trump original meaning if the two were to come into conflict. From this
perspective, fidelity to original meaning is not the chief goal of
constitutional theory. For originalists, the original meaning is the trump
card and could not be appropriately overridden by other considerations
when seeking to interpret the Constitution. For nonoriginalists, original
meaning may be important, but it is hardly a trump card—nor is the
discernment of original meaning the primary goal of constitutional
interpretation. We might imagine, for example, that a concern with good
outcomes should trump original meaning. While it might be useful to
determine what a constitutional provision originally meant, the interpreter
should perhaps keep one eye on the likely effects of such a reading of the
constitutional text and, if necessary, make some adjustments. To borrow a
phrase, critics of originalism might be “faint-hearted.”124 Confronted with
suitably unpleasant results, the nonoriginalist might posit that the original
meaning should be sacrificed.
Alternatively, we might think that
contemporary public opinion should trump original meaning.
124. Scalia, supra note 2, at 862. As with Scalia himself, the implication here is not that
the fainthearted are cowardly, but simply that they regard the medicine as sometimes “too
strong to swallow.” Id. at 861. Scalia suggested that even originalists should make some
concessions to political and social reality. We might instead think that constitutional theory
should be consequentialist and should appropriately reject an approach that tends, in general
or in specific cases, to produce unpalatable results, or that constitutional theory should be a
moral enterprise concerned with generating rules that reflect true claims about the political
good.
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Contemporary public opinion might be an independent source of law, or it
might be situated within a theory of constitutional legitimacy in which the
authoritative constitutional rules are those that can command respect and
assent from the current populace, regardless of their pedigree.
Underlying all these considerations is a view that courts are authorized to
impose constitutional rules other than those adopted by the constitutional
drafters. This returns to the question of whether courts are limited to
constitutional interpretation or whether they may exercise the power of
judicial review on other grounds. Originalists disagree among themselves
on this question, but the disagreement with nonoriginalists is more
particular. An originalist might accept that courts can operate with some
discretion within the boundaries set by the discoverable meaning of the
Constitution, and that they can construct doctrine that is not dictated by
constitutional interpretation so long as it does not conflict with
constitutional interpretation. The crucial point of disagreement with
nonoriginalists must be with whether courts may also exercise discretion to
construct doctrine that does conflict with the original meaning of the
Constitution. The originalist need not conclude that judges must stay their
hand when they reach points of constitutional indeterminacy, but the
originalist must insist that judges not close their eyes to the discoverable
meaning of the Constitution and announce some other constitutional rule to
supersede it.125 It is at that point that the originalist and the nonoriginalist
must part ways.
CONCLUSION
To borrow from Daniel Farber, “It is not my purpose in this essay to
convert readers to my own view about originalism.”126 I have staked out
positions of my own within the originalism debate, and, of course, I am
fond of them.127 My goal here, however, is to survey the terrain at this
point in the originalism debate. A great deal of work has been done since
the first wave of the originalism debate. Originalists developed arguments
and came to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, but the number of
participants in that theory-building exercise was relatively few and the
central concerns of their arguments were rather immediate and political.
Those advocates of originalism were met with a substantial response. Over
125. Again, there are qualifications to be added here to address extraordinary
circumstances or entrenched precedents, to which originalists might disagree on how to
respond. But significantly, in such circumstances the authority for judicial action would rest
explicitly on noninterpretive grounds. Judges would take action in a crisis because such
action was necessary, or judges would adhere to doctrine because such adherence is required
by considerations of fairness and good order. While the worry about precedent from an
originalist perspective is that the exception might swallow the rule, the points of separation
between theories are not best measured by the exceptions. The interesting gap between
originalists and their critics is not on how doctrinal mistakes should be corrected, for the
doctrine that originalists would regard as mistakes might be embraced and exalted by the
nonoriginalist.
126. Farber, supra note 14, at 1104.
127. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 20.
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the past decade or so, another round of originalist theory has emerged. This
second wave of theorizing has often (though not entirely) been advanced by
a new generation of advocates, and has generally had a lower political
profile and stronger academic orientation. While this new originalism
shares many features of the old, there are some significant differences, and
the contours of the current version of originalist theory should be properly
recognized.
There remain important differences and issues that are subject to debate
among originalists. It is hard to imagine how the situation could be any
different, absent reducing originalist theory to the views of a single
canonical figure or organizing a political movement concerned with
generating a manifesto. Those who engage in originalist theory come to the
topic from a range of substantive concerns, normative commitments, and
ideological angles. Even so, this second wave of originalism seems to have
settled on a set of commonalities, even as a number of issues important to
the theory of originalism remain internally contested. Today, originalism is
clearer on the centrality of the public meaning of the constitutional text and
more agnostic about the importance of judicial restraint than it once was.
The rationales for originalism and relationship between originalist
constitutional interpretation and the exercise of judicial review remain
matters of continued disagreement. If these adjustments have brought
originalist theory closer to the views of many of its critics, there remain
important points of separation between originalism and other approaches to
constitutional theory. The questions of how important constitutional
interpretation should be to the development of constitutional law and
whether we should remain bound to the Founders’ text are, I believe, central
to the continuing disagreement between originalists and their critics.

